Penghindaran Pertahanan: Command Line File ELF Base64
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Simpan dan kategorikan konten berdasarkan preferensi Anda.
Dokumen ini menjelaskan jenis temuan ancaman di Security Command Center. Temuan ancaman dibuat oleh
pendeteksi ancaman saat mendeteksi
potensi ancaman di resource cloud Anda. Untuk daftar lengkap temuan ancaman yang tersedia, lihat Indeks temuan ancaman.
Ringkasan
Proses yang dijalankan berisi argumen yang merupakan file ELF (Executable and Linkable Format). Jika eksekusi file ELF yang dienkode terdeteksi, hal ini merupakan sinyal bahwa penyerang sedang mencoba mengenkode data biner untuk ditransfer ke command line khusus ASCII. Penyerang dapat menggunakan teknik ini untuk menghindari deteksi dan menjalankan kode berbahaya yang disematkan dalam file ELF.
Cara merespons
Untuk menanggapi temuan ini, lakukan hal berikut:
Langkah 1: Tinjau detail temuan
Buka temuan Defense Evasion: Base64 ELF File Command Line seperti yang diarahkan di Meninjau temuan. Panel detail untuk temuan akan terbuka di tab Ringkasan.
Di tab Summary, tinjau informasi di bagian berikut:
Apa yang terdeteksi, terutama kolom berikut:
Biner program: jalur absolut biner yang dieksekusi.
Argumen: argumen yang diteruskan selama eksekusi biner.
Resource yang terpengaruh, terutama kolom berikut:
Nama lengkap resource: nama lengkap resource
cluster termasuk nomor project, lokasi, dan nama cluster.
Di tampilan detail temuan, klik tab JSON.
Dalam JSON, perhatikan kolom berikut.
resource:
project_display_name: nama project yang berisi
cluster.
finding:
processes:
binary:
path: jalur lengkap biner yang dieksekusi.
args: argumen yang diberikan saat menjalankan biner.
sourceProperties:
Pod_Namespace: nama namespace Kubernetes Pod.
Pod_Name: nama Pod GKE.
Container_Name: nama container yang terpengaruh.
Container_Image_Uri: nama image container yang di-deploy.
VM_Instance_Name: nama node GKE tempat
Pod dieksekusi.
Identifikasi temuan lain yang terjadi pada waktu yang serupa untuk penampung ini.
Temuan terkait mungkin menunjukkan bahwa aktivitas ini berbahaya, bukan karena kegagalan mengikuti praktik terbaik.
Langkah 2: Tinjau cluster dan node
Di konsol Google Cloud , buka halaman Kubernetes clusters.
Di toolbar konsol Google Cloud , pilih project yang tercantum di
resource.project_display_name, jika perlu.
Pilih cluster yang tercantum di baris Nama lengkap resource di tab Ringkasan pada detail temuan. Catat metadata apa pun tentang cluster dan pemiliknya.
Klik tab Nodes. Pilih node yang tercantum di VM_Instance_Name.
Klik tab Detail dan perhatikan anotasi
container.googleapis.com/instance_id.
Langkah 3: Tinjau Pod
Di konsol Google Cloud , buka halaman Kubernetes Workloads.
Di toolbar konsol Google Cloud , pilih project yang tercantum di
resource.project_display_name, jika perlu.
Filter pada cluster yang tercantum di baris Nama lengkap resource di tab
Ringkasan pada detail temuan dan namespace Pod yang tercantum di Pod_Namespace, jika perlu.
Pilih Pod yang tercantum di Pod_Name. Catat metadata apa pun tentang Pod dan pemiliknya.
Untuk mengembangkan rencana respons, gabungkan hasil penyelidikan Anda dengan penelitian MITRE.
Langkah 7: Terapkan respons Anda
Rencana respons berikut mungkin sesuai untuk temuan ini, tetapi juga dapat memengaruhi operasi.
Evaluasi dengan cermat informasi yang Anda kumpulkan dalam penyelidikan untuk menentukan cara terbaik dalam menyelesaikan temuan.
Hubungi pemilik project dengan penampung yang disusupi.
Hentikan atau hapus container yang
terkompromi dan ganti dengan
container baru.
[[["Mudah dipahami","easyToUnderstand","thumb-up"],["Memecahkan masalah saya","solvedMyProblem","thumb-up"],["Lainnya","otherUp","thumb-up"]],[["Sulit dipahami","hardToUnderstand","thumb-down"],["Informasi atau kode contoh salah","incorrectInformationOrSampleCode","thumb-down"],["Informasi/contoh yang saya butuhkan tidak ada","missingTheInformationSamplesINeed","thumb-down"],["Masalah terjemahan","translationIssue","thumb-down"],["Lainnya","otherDown","thumb-down"]],["Terakhir diperbarui pada 2025-09-05 UTC."],[],[],null,["| Premium and Enterprise [service tiers](/security-command-center/docs/service-tiers)\n\nThis document describes a threat finding type in Security Command Center. Threat findings are generated by\n[threat detectors](/security-command-center/docs/concepts-security-sources#threats) when they detect\na potential threat in your cloud resources. For a full list of available threat findings, see [Threat findings index](/security-command-center/docs/threat-findings-index).\n\nOverview\n\nA process was executed that contains an argument that is an\nELF (Executable and Linkable Format) file. If an encoded ELF file execution is\ndetected, it is a signal that an attacker is trying encode binary data for\ntransfer to ASCII-only command lines. Attackers can use this technique to evade\ndetection and run malicious code embedded in an ELF file.\n\nHow to respond\n\nTo respond to this finding, do the following:\n\nStep 1: Review finding details\n\n1. Open an `Defense Evasion: Base64 ELF File Command Line` finding as\n directed in [Reviewing findings](/security-command-center/docs/how-to-investigate-threats#reviewing_findings). The details panel for\n the finding opens to the **Summary** tab.\n\n2. On the **Summary** tab, review the information in the following sections:\n\n - **What was detected** , especially the following fields:\n - **Program binary**: the absolute path of the executed binary.\n - **Arguments**: the arguments passed during binary execution.\n - **Affected resource** , especially the following fields:\n - **Resource full name** : the [full resource name](/apis/design/resource_names) of the cluster including the project number, location, and cluster name.\n3. In the detail view of the finding, click the **JSON** tab.\n\n4. In the JSON, note the following fields.\n\n - `resource`:\n - `project_display_name`: the name of the project that contains the cluster.\n - `finding`:\n - `processes`:\n - `binary`:\n - `path`: the full path of the executed binary.\n - `args`: the arguments that were provided while executing the binary.\n - `sourceProperties`:\n - `Pod_Namespace`: the name of the Pod's Kubernetes namespace.\n - `Pod_Name`: the name of the GKE Pod.\n - `Container_Name`: the name of the affected container.\n - `Container_Image_Uri`: the name of the container image being deployed.\n - `VM_Instance_Name`: the name of the GKE node where the Pod executed.\n5. Identify other findings that occurred at a similar time for this container.\n Related findings might indicate that this activity was malicious, instead of\n a failure to follow best practices.\n\nStep 2: Review cluster and node\n\n1. In the Google Cloud console, go to the **Kubernetes clusters** page.\n\n [Go to Kubernetes clusters](https://console.cloud.google.com/kubernetes/list)\n\n \u003cbr /\u003e\n\n2. On the Google Cloud console toolbar, select the project listed in\n `resource.project_display_name`, if necessary.\n\n3. Select the cluster listed on the **Resource full name** row in the\n **Summary** tab of the finding details. Note any metadata about\n the cluster and its owner.\n\n4. Click the **Nodes** tab. Select the node listed in `VM_Instance_Name`.\n\n5. Click the **Details** tab and note the\n `container.googleapis.com/instance_id` annotation.\n\nStep 3: Review Pod\n\n1. In the Google Cloud console, go to the **Kubernetes Workloads** page.\n\n [Go to Kubernetes Workloads](https://console.cloud.google.com/kubernetes/workload)\n\n \u003cbr /\u003e\n\n2. On the Google Cloud console toolbar, select the project listed in\n `resource.project_display_name`, if necessary.\n\n3. Filter on the cluster listed on the **Resource full name** row in the\n **Summary** tab of the finding details and the Pod namespace\n listed in `Pod_Namespace`, if necessary.\n\n4. Select the Pod listed in `Pod_Name`. Note any metadata about the Pod and\n its owner.\n\nStep 4: Check logs\n\n1. In the Google Cloud console, go to **Logs Explorer**.\n\n [Go to Logs Explorer](https://console.cloud.google.com/logs/query)\n2. On the Google Cloud console toolbar, select the project listed in\n `resource.project_display_name`, if necessary.\n\n3. Set **Select time range** to the period of interest.\n\n4. On the page that loads, do the following:\n\n 1. Find Pod logs for `Pod_Name` by using the following filter:\n - `resource.type=\"k8s_container\"`\n - `resource.labels.project_id=\"`\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eRESOURCE.PROJECT_DISPLAY_NAME\u003c/var\u003e`\"`\n - `resource.labels.location=\"`\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eLOCATION\u003c/var\u003e`\"`\n - `resource.labels.cluster_name=\"`\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eCLUSTER_NAME\u003c/var\u003e`\"`\n - `resource.labels.namespace_name=\"`\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003ePOD_NAMESPACE\u003c/var\u003e`\"`\n - `resource.labels.pod_name=\"`\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003ePOD_NAME\u003c/var\u003e`\"`\n 2. Find cluster audit logs by using the following filter:\n - `logName=\"projects/`\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eRESOURCE.PROJECT_DISPLAY_NAME\u003c/var\u003e`/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity\"`\n - `resource.type=\"k8s_cluster\"`\n - `resource.labels.project_id=\"`\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eRESOURCE.PROJECT_DISPLAY_NAME\u003c/var\u003e`\"`\n - `resource.labels.location=\"`\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eLOCATION\u003c/var\u003e`\"`\n - `resource.labels.cluster_name=\"`\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eCLUSTER_NAME\u003c/var\u003e`\"`\n - \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003ePOD_NAME\u003c/var\u003e\n 3. Find GKE node console logs by using the following filter:\n - `resource.type=\"gce_instance\"`\n - `resource.labels.instance_id=\"`\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eINSTANCE_ID\u003c/var\u003e`\"`\n\nStep 5: Investigate running container\n\nIf the container is still running, it might be possible to investigate the\ncontainer environment directly.\n\n1. Go to the Google Cloud console.\n\n [Open Google Cloud console](https://console.cloud.google.com/)\n2. On the Google Cloud console toolbar, select the project listed in\n `resource.project_display_name`, if necessary.\n\n3. Click **Activate Cloud Shell**\n\n4. Obtain GKE credentials for your cluster by running the\n following commands.\n\n For zonal clusters: \n\n gcloud container clusters get-credentials \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eCLUSTER_NAME\u003c/var\u003e \\\n --zone \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eLOCATION\u003c/var\u003e \\\n --project \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003ePROJECT_NAME\u003c/var\u003e\n\n For regional clusters: \n\n gcloud container clusters get-credentials \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eCLUSTER_NAME\u003c/var\u003e \\\n --region \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eLOCATION\u003c/var\u003e \\\n --project \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003ePROJECT_NAME\u003c/var\u003e\n\n Replace the following:\n - \u003cvar translate=\"no\"\u003eCLUSTER_NAME\u003c/var\u003e: the cluster listed in `resource.labels.cluster_name`\n - \u003cvar translate=\"no\"\u003eLOCATION\u003c/var\u003e: the location listed in `resource.labels.location`\n - \u003cvar translate=\"no\"\u003ePROJECT_NAME\u003c/var\u003e: the project name listed in `resource.project_display_name`\n5. Retrieve the executed binary:\n\n kubectl cp \\\n \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003ePOD_NAMESPACE\u003c/var\u003e/\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003ePOD_NAME\u003c/var\u003e:\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003ePROCESS_BINARY_FULLPATH\u003c/var\u003e \\\n -c \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eCONTAINER_NAME\u003c/var\u003e \\\n \u003cvar translate=\"no\"\u003eLOCAL_FILE\u003c/var\u003e\n\n Replace \u003cvar translate=\"no\"\u003elocal_file\u003c/var\u003e with a local file path to store the\n added binary.\n6. Connect to the container environment by running the following command:\n\n kubectl exec \\\n --namespace=\u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003ePOD_NAMESPACE\u003c/var\u003e \\\n -ti \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003ePOD_NAME\u003c/var\u003e \\\n -c \u003cvar class=\"edit\" translate=\"no\"\u003eCONTAINER_NAME\u003c/var\u003e \\\n -- /bin/sh\n\n This command requires the container to have a shell installed at `/bin/sh`.\n\nStep 6: Research attack and response methods\n\n1. Review MITRE ATT\\&CK framework entries for this finding type: [Defense Evasion: Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques//T1027/).\n2. To develop a response plan, combine your investigation results with MITRE research.\n\nStep 7: Implement your response\n\n\nThe following response plan might be appropriate for this finding, but might also impact operations.\nCarefully evaluate the information you gather in your investigation to determine the best way to\nresolve findings.\n\n- Contact the owner of the project with the compromised container.\n- Stop or [delete](/container-registry/docs/managing#deleting_images) the compromised container and replace it with a [new container](/compute/docs/containers).\n\nWhat's next\n\n- Learn [how to work with threat\n findings in Security Command Center](/security-command-center/docs/how-to-investigate-threats).\n- Refer to the [Threat findings index](/security-command-center/docs/threat-findings-index).\n- Learn how to [review a\n finding](/security-command-center/docs/how-to-investigate-threats#reviewing_findings) through the Google Cloud console.\n- Learn about the [services that\n generate threat findings](/security-command-center/docs/concepts-security-sources#threats)."]]
