Overview of Event Threat Detection

Premium tier only: This feature is available only with the Security Command Center Premium tier.

What is Event Threat Detection?

Event Threat Detection is a built-in service for the Security Command Center Premium tier that continuously monitors your organization or projects and identifies threats within your systems in near-real time. Event Threat Detection is regularly updated with new detectors to identify emerging threats at cloud scale.

How Event Threat Detection works

Event Threat Detection monitors the Cloud Logging stream for your organization or projects. If you activate Security Command Center Premium tier at the organization level, Event Threat Detection consumes logs for your projects as they are created and Event Threat Detection can monitor Google Workspace Logs. Cloud Logging contains log entries of API calls and other actions that create, read, or modify the configuration or metadata of your resources. Google Workspace logs track user sign-ins to your domain and provide a record of actions performed on your Google Workspace Admin Console.

Log entries contain status and event information that Event Threat Detection uses to quickly detect threats. Event Threat Detection applies detection logic and proprietary threat intelligence, including tripwire indicator matching, windowed profiling, advanced profiling, machine learning, and anomaly detection, to identify threats in near-real time.

When Event Threat Detection detects a threat, it writes a finding to Security Command Center. If you activate Security Command Center Premium tier at the organization level, Security Command Center can write findings to a Cloud Logging project. From Cloud Logging and Google Workspace logging, you can export findings to other systems with Pub/Sub and process them with Cloud Run functions.

If you activate Security Command Center Premium tier at the organization level, you can additionally use Google Security Operations to investigate some findings. Google SecOps is a Google Cloud service that lets you investigate threats and pivot through related entities in a unified timeline. For instructions on sending findings to Google SecOps, see Investigate findings in Google SecOps.

Your ability to view and edit findings and logs is determined by the Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles you are granted. For more information on Security Command Center IAM roles, see Access control.

Event Threat Detection rules

Rules define the type of threats that Event Threat Detection detects and the types of logs that must be enabled for detectors to work. Admin Activity audit logs are always written; you can't configure or disable them.

Event Threat Detection includes the following default rules:

Active Scan Brute force Command and Control Credential Access Data Destruction Defense Evasion Denial of Service Discovery Exfiltration Impact Impair Defenses Inhibit System Recovery Initial Access Lateral Movement Malware Persistence Privilege Escalation Resource Development Clear all

Display name	API name	Log source types	Description
Active Scan: Log4j Vulnerable to RCE	Unavailable	Cloud DNS logs	Detects active Log4j vulnerabilities by identifying DNS queries for unobfuscated domains that were initiated by supported Log4j vulnerability scanners.
Inhibit System Recovery: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR host	BACKUP_HOSTS_DELETE_HOST	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Service Admin Activity audit logs	A host was deleted from Backup and DR. Applications that are associated with the deleted host might not be protected.
Data Destruction: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire image	BACKUP_EXPIRE_IMAGE	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	A user requested the deletion of a backup image from Backup and DR. The deletion of a backup image does not prevent future backups.
Inhibit System Recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR remove plan	BACKUP_REMOVE_PLAN	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	A backup plan with multiple policies for an application was deleted from Backup and DR. The deletion of a backup plan can prevent future backups.
Data Destruction: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire all images	BACKUP_EXPIRE_IMAGES_ALL	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	A user requested the deletion of all backup images for a protected application from Backup and DR. The deletion of backup images does not prevent future backups.
Inhibit System Recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete template	BACKUP_TEMPLATES_DELETE_TEMPLATE	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	A predefined backup template, which is used to set up backups for multiple applications, was deleted. The ability to set up backups in the future might be impacted.
Inhibit System Recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete policy	BACKUP_TEMPLATES_DELETE_POLICY	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	A Backup and DR policy, which defines how a backup is taken and where it is stored, was deleted. Future backups that use the policy might fail.
Inhibit System Recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete profile	BACKUP_PROFILES_DELETE_PROFILE	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	A Backup and DR profile, which defines which storage pools should be used to store backups, was deleted. Future backups that use the profile might fail.
Data Destruction: Google Cloud Backup and DR remove appliance	BACKUP_APPLIANCES_REMOVE_APPLIANCE	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	A backup appliance was deleted from Backup and DR. Applications that are associated with the deleted backup appliance might not be protected.
Inhibit System Recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete storage pool	BACKUP_STORAGE_POOLS_DELETE	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	A storage pool, which associates a Cloud Storage bucket with Backup and DR, has been removed from Backup and DR. Future backups to this storage target will fail.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduced backup expiration	BACKUP_REDUCE_BACKUP_EXPIRATION	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	The expiration date for a backup protected by Backup and DR has been reduced.
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduced backup frequency	BACKUP_REDUCE_BACKUP_FREQUENCY	Cloud Audit Logs: Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	The Backup and DR backup schedule has been modified to reduce backup frequency.
Brute force SSH	BRUTE_FORCE_SSH	authlog	Detection of successful brute force of SSH on a host.
Cloud IDS: THREAT_IDENTIFIER	CLOUD_IDS_THREAT_ACTIVITY	Cloud IDS logs	Threat events that are detected by Cloud IDS. Cloud IDS detects layer 7 attacks by analyzing mirrored packets and, when a threat event is detected, sends a threat-class finding to Security Command Center. Finding category names start with "Cloud IDS" followed by the Cloud IDS threat identifier. The Cloud IDS integration with Event Threat Detection does not include Cloud IDS vulnerability detections. To learn more about Cloud IDS detections, see Cloud IDS Logging information.
Credential Access: External Member Added To Privileged Group	EXTERNAL_MEMBER_ADDED_TO_PRIVILEGED_GROUP	Google Workspace Logs: Login Audit Permissions: DATA_READ	Detects events where an external member is added to a privileged Google Group (a group granted sensitive roles or permissions). A finding is generated only if the group doesn't already contain other external members from the same organization as the newly added member. To learn more, see Unsafe Google Group changes. Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles associated with the group change. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Credential Access: Privileged Group Opened To Public	PRIVILEGED_GROUP_OPENED_TO_PUBLIC	Google Workspace: Admin Audit Permissions: DATA_READ	Detects events where a privileged Google Group (a group granted sensitive roles or permissions) is changed to be accessible to the general public. To learn more, see Unsafe Google Group changes. Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles associated with the group change. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Credential Access: Sensitive Role Granted To Hybrid Group	SENSITIVE_ROLE_TO_GROUP_WITH_EXTERNAL_MEMBER	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects events where sensitive roles are granted to a Google Group with external members. To learn more, see Unsafe Google Group changes. Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles associated with the group change. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Defense Evasion: Breakglass Workload Deployment Created (Preview)	BINARY_AUTHORIZATION_BREAKGLASS_WORKLOAD_CREATE	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detects the deployment of workloads that are deployed by using the break-glass flag to override Binary Authorization controls.
Defense Evasion: Breakglass Workload Deployment Updated (Preview)	BINARY_AUTHORIZATION_BREAKGLASS_WORKLOAD_UPDATE	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detects when workloads are updated by using the break-glass flag to override Binary Authorization controls.
Defense Evasion: Modify VPC Service Control	DEFENSE_EVASION_MODIFY_VPC_SERVICE_CONTROL	Cloud Audit Logs VPC Service Controls audit logs	Detects a change to an existing VPC Service Controls perimeter that would lead to a reduction in the protection offered by that perimeter. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Discovery: Can get sensitive Kubernetes object check	GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_CAN_GET_SENSITIVE_OBJECT	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Data Access logs	A potentially malicious actor attempted to determine what sensitive objects in GKE they can query for, by using the kubectl auth can-i get command. Specifically, the rule detects whether the actor checked for API access on the following objects: * (all) cluster-admin ClusterRole Secret
Discovery: Service Account Self-Investigation	SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SELF_INVESTIGATION	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Data Access audit logs Permissions: DATA_READ	Detection of an IAM service account credential that is used t investigate the roles and permissions associated with that same service account. Sensitive roles Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles granted. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions.
Evasion: Access from Anonymizing Proxy	ANOMALOUS_ACCESS	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detection of Google Cloud service modifications that originated from anonymous proxy IP addresses, like Tor IP addresses.
Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Exfiltration	DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY	Cloud Audit Logs: BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs Permissions: DATA_READ	Detects the following scenarios: Resources owned by the protected organization that are saved outside of the organization, including copy or transfer operations. This scenario is indicated by a subrule of exfil_to_external_table and a severity of HIGH. Attempts to access BigQuery resources that are protected by VPC Service Controls. This scenario is indicated by a subrule of vpc_perimeter_violation and a severity of LOW.
Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Extraction	DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY_EXTRACTION	Cloud Audit Logs: BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs Permissions: DATA_READ	Detects the following scenarios: A BigQuery resource owned by the protected organization is saved, through extraction operations, to a Cloud Storage bucket outside the organization. A BigQuery resource owned by the protected organization is saved, through extraction operations, to a publicly accessible Cloud Storage bucket owned by that organization. For project-level activations of the Security Command Center Premium tier, this finding is available only if the Standard tier is enabled in the parent organization.
Exfiltration: BigQuery Data to Google Drive	DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY_TO_GOOGLE_DRIVE	Cloud Audit Logs: BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs Permissions: DATA_READ	Detects the following: A BigQuery resource owned by the protected organization is saved, through extraction operations, to a Google Drive folder.
Exfiltration: Move to Public BigQuery resource	DATA_EXFILTRATION_BIG_QUERY_TO_PUBLIC_RESOURCE	Cloud Audit Logs: BigQueryAuditMetadata data access logs Permissions: DATA_READ	Detects the following: A BigQuery resource is saved to a public resource owned by your organization.
Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Data Exfiltration	CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_EXPORT_TO_EXTERNAL_GCS CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_EXPORT_TO_PUBLIC_GCS	Cloud Audit Logs: MySQL data access logs PostgreSQL data access logs SQL Server data access logs	Detects the following scenarios: Live instance data exported to a Cloud Storage bucket outside of the organization. Live instance data exported to a Cloud Storage bucket that is owned by the organization and is publicly accessible. For project-level activations of the Security Command Center Premium tier, this finding is available only if the Standard tier is enabled in the parent organization.
Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External Organization	CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_RESTORE_BACKUP_TO_EXTERNAL_INSTANCE	Cloud Audit Logs: MySQL admin activity logs PostgreSQL admin activity logs SQL Server admin activity logs	Detects events where the backup of a Cloud SQL instance is restored to an instance outside of the organization.
Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Over-Privileged Grant	CLOUDSQL_EXFIL_USER_GRANTED_ALL_PERMISSIONS	Cloud Audit Logs: PostgreSQL data access logs Note: You must enable the pgAudit extension to use this rule.	Detects events where a Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL user or role has been granted all privileges to a database, or to all tables, procedures, or functions in a schema.
Initial Access: Database Superuser Writes to User Tables	CLOUDSQL_SUPERUSER_WRITES_TO_USER_TABLES	Cloud Audit Logs: Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL data access logs Cloud SQL for MySQL data access logs Note: You must enable the pgAudit extension for PostgreSQL or database auditing for MySQL to use this rule.	Detects events where a Cloud SQL superuser (postgres for PostgreSQL servers or root for MySQL users) writes to non-system tables.
Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Over-Privileged Grant	ALLOYDB_USER_GRANTED_ALL_PERMISSIONS	Cloud Audit Logs: AlloyDB for PostgreSQL data access logs Note: You must enable the pgAudit extension to use this rule.	Detects events where an AlloyDB for PostgreSQL user or role has been granted all privileges to a database, or to all tables, procedures, or functions in a schema.
Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Database Superuser Writes to User Tables	ALLOYDB_SUPERUSER_WRITES_TO_USER_TABLES	Cloud Audit Logs: AlloyDB for PostgreSQL data access logs Note: You must enable the pgAudit extension to use this rule.	Detects events where an AlloyDB for PostgreSQL superuser (postgres) writes to non-system tables.
Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Action	DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_USED_IN_ACTION	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detects events where a dormant user-managed service account triggered an action. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days.
Privilege Escalation: Dormant Service Account Granted Sensitive Role	DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ADDED_IN_IAM_ROLE	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects events where a dormant user-managed service account was granted one or more sensitive IAM roles. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days. Sensitive roles Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles granted. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions.
Persistence: Impersonation Role Granted For Dormant Service Account	DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_IMPERSONATION_ROLE_GRANTED	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects events where a principal is granted permissions to impersonate a dormant user-managed service account. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days.
Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Key Created	DORMANT_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY_CREATED	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detects events where a key is created for a dormant user-managed service account. In this context, a service account is considered dormant if it has been inactive for more than 180 days.
Initial Access: Leaked Service Account Key Used	LEAKED_SA_KEY_USED	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs Data Access logs	Detects events where a leaked service account key is used to authenticate the action. In this context, a leaked service account key is one that was posted on the public internet.
Initial Access: Excessive Permission Denied Actions	EXCESSIVE_FAILED_ATTEMPT	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detects events where a principal repeatedly triggers permission denied errors by attempting changes across multiple methods and services.
Impair Defenses: Strong Authentication Disabled	ENFORCE_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION	Google Workspace: Admin Audit	2-step verification was disabled for the organization. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Impair Defenses: Two Step Verification Disabled	2SV_DISABLE	Google Workspace Logs: Login Audit Permissions: DATA_READ	A user disabled 2-step verification. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Initial Access: Account Disabled Hijacked	ACCOUNT_DISABLED_HIJACKED	Google Workspace Logs: Login Audit Permissions: DATA_READ	A user's account was suspended due to suspicious activity. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Initial Access: Disabled Password Leak	ACCOUNT_DISABLED_PASSWORD_LEAK	Google Workspace Logs: Login Audit Permissions: DATA_READ	A user's account is disabled because a password leak was detected. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Initial Access: Government Based Attack	GOV_ATTACK_WARNING	Google Workspace Logs: Login Audit Permissions: DATA_READ	Government-backed attackers might have tried to compromise a user account or computer. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Initial Access: Log4j Compromise Attempt	Unavailable	Cloud Load Balancing Logs: Cloud HTTP Load Balancer Note: You must enable external Application Load Balancer logging to use this rule.	Detects Java Naming and Directory Interface (JNDI) lookups within headers or URL parameters. These lookups may indicate attempts at Log4Shell exploitation. These findings have low severity, because they only indicate a detection or exploit attempt, not a vulnerability or a compromise. This rule is always on.
Initial Access: Suspicious Login Blocked	SUSPICIOUS_LOGIN	Google Workspace Logs: Login Audit Permissions: DATA_READ	A suspicious login to a user's account was detected and blocked. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Log4j Malware: Bad Domain	LOG4J_BAD_DOMAIN	Cloud DNS logs	Detection of Log4j exploit traffic based on a connection to, or a lookup of, a known domain used in Log4j attacks.
Log4j Malware: Bad IP	LOG4J_BAD_IP	VPC flow logs Firewall Rules logs Cloud NAT logs	Detection of Log4j exploit traffic based on a connection to a known IP address used in Log4j attacks.
Malware: bad domain	MALWARE_BAD_DOMAIN	Cloud DNS logs	Detection of malware based on a connection to, or a lookup of, a known bad domain.
Malware: bad IP	MALWARE_BAD_IP	VPC flow logs Firewall Rules logs Cloud NAT logs	Detection of malware based on a connection to a known bad IP address.
Malware: Cryptomining Bad Domain	CRYPTOMINING_POOL_DOMAIN	Cloud DNS logs	Detection of cryptomining based on a connection to, or a lookup of, a known mining domain.
Malware: Cryptomining Bad IP	CRYPTOMINING_POOL_IP	VPC flow logs Firewall Rules logs Cloud NAT logs	Detection of cryptomining based on a connection to a known mining IP address.
Outgoing DoS^Shut down	OUTGOING_DOS	VPC flow logs	Detection of outgoing denial of service traffic.
Persistence: GCE Admin Added SSH Key	GCE_ADMIN_ADD_SSH_KEY	Cloud Audit Logs: Compute Engine Admin Activity audit logs	Detection of a modification to the Compute Engine instance metadata ssh key value on an established instance (older than 1 week).
Persistence: GCE Admin Added Startup Script	GCE_ADMIN_ADD_STARTUP_SCRIPT	Cloud Audit Logs: Compute Engine Admin Activity audit logs	Detection of a modification to the Compute Engine instance metadata startup script value on an established instance (older than 1 week).
Persistence: IAM Anomalous Grant	IAM_ANOMALOUS_GRANT	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	This finding includes subrules that provide more specific information about each instance of this finding. The following list shows all possible subrules: external_service_account_added_to_policy, external_member_added_to_policy: Detection of privileges granted to IAM users and service accounts that are not members of your organization or, if Security Command Center is activated at the project level only, your project. Note: If Security Command Center is activated at the organization level at any tier, then this detector uses an organization's existing IAM policies as context. If Security Command Center activation is only at the project level, then the detector uses only the project's IAM policies as context. If a sensitive IAM grant to an external member occurs, and there are less than three existing IAM policies that are similar to it, this detector generates a finding. Sensitive roles Findings are classified as High or Medium severity, depending on the sensitivity of the roles granted. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions. external_member_invited_to_policy: Detects when an external member is invited as the owner of the project through the InsertProjectOwnershipInvite API. custom_role_given_sensitive_permissions: Detects when the setIAMPolicy permission is added to a custom role. service_account_granted_sensitive_role_to_member: Detects when privileged roles are granted to members through a service account. This subrule is triggered by a subset of sensitive roles that include only basic IAM roles and certain data storage roles. For more information, see Sensitive IAM roles and permissions. policy_modified_by_default_compute_service_account: Detects when a default Compute Engine service account is used to modify project IAM settings.
Persistence: Unmanaged Account Granted Sensitive Role (Preview)	UNMANAGED_ACCOUNT_ADDED_IN_IAM_ROLE	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detection of a sensitive role being granted to an unmanaged account.
Persistence: New API Method	ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_NEW_API_METHOD	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detection of anomalous usage of Google Cloud services by IAM service accounts.
Persistence: New Geography	IAM_ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_IP_GEOLOCATION	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detection of IAM user and service accounts accessing Google Cloud from anomalous locations, based on the geolocation of the requesting IP addresses. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Persistence: New User Agent	IAM_ANOMALOUS_BEHAVIOR_USER_AGENT	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detection of IAM service accounts accessing Google Cloud from anomalous or suspicious user agents. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Persistence: SSO Enablement Toggle	TOGGLE_SSO_ENABLED	Google Workspace: Admin Audit	The Enable SSO (single sign-on) setting on the admin account was disabled. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Persistence: SSO Settings Changed	CHANGE_SSO_SETTINGS	Google Workspace: Admin Audit	The SSO settings for the admin account were changed. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Impersonation of Service Account for Admin Activity	ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATION_OF_SA_ADMIN_ACTIVITY	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detects when a potentially anomalous impersonated service account is used for an administrative activity.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Admin Activity	ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_MULTISTEP_ADMIN_ACTIVITY	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detects when an anomalous multistep delegated request is found for an administrative activity.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Data Access	ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_MULTISTEP_DATA_ACCESS	Cloud Audit Logs: Data Access logs	Detects when an anomalous multistep delegated request is found for a data access activity.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for Admin Activity	ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATOR_ADMIN_ACTIVITY	Cloud Audit Logs: Admin Activity logs	Detects when a potentially anomalous caller/impersonator in a delegation chain is used for an administrative activity.
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for Data Access	ANOMALOUS_SA_DELEGATION_IMPERSONATOR_DATA_ACCESS	Cloud Audit Logs: Data Access logs	Detects when a potentially anomalous caller/impersonator in a delegation chain is used for a data access activity.
Privilege Escalation: Changes to sensitive Kubernetes RBAC objects	GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_EDIT_SENSITIVE_RBAC_OBJECT	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	To escalate privilege, a potentially malicious actor attempted to modify a ClusterRole, RoleBinding, or ClusterRoleBinding role-based access control (RBAC) object of the sensitive cluster-admin role by using a PUT or PATCH request.
Privilege Escalation: Create Kubernetes CSR for master cert	GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_CSR_FOR_MASTER_CERT	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	A potentially malicious actor created a Kubernetes master certificate signing request (CSR), which gives them cluster-admin access.
Privilege Escalation: Creation of sensitive Kubernetes bindings	GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_CREATE_SENSITIVE_BINDING	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	To escalate privilege, a potentially malicious actor attempted to create a new RoleBinding or ClusterRoleBinding object for the cluster-admin role.
Privilege Escalation: Get Kubernetes CSR with compromised bootstrap credentials	GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_GET_CSR_WITH_COMPROMISED_BOOTSTRAP_CREDENTIALS	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Data Access logs	A potentially malicious actor queried for a certificate signing request (CSR), with the kubectl command, using compromised bootstrap credentials.
Privilege Escalation: Launch of privileged Kubernetes container	GKE_CONTROL_PLANE_LAUNCH_PRIVILEGED_CONTAINER	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	A potentially malicious actor created a Pod that contains privileged containers or containers with privilege escalation capabilities. A privileged container has the privileged field set to true. A container with privilege escalation capabilities has the allowPrivilegeEscalation field set to true. For more information, see the SecurityContext v1 core API reference in the Kubernetes documentation.
Persistence: Service Account Key Created	SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY_CREATION	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects the creation of a service account key. Service account keys are long-lived credentials that increase the risk of unauthorized access to Google Cloud resources.
Privilege Escalation: Global Shutdown Script Added	GLOBAL_SHUTDOWN_SCRIPT_ADDED	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when a global shutdown script is added to a project.
Persistence: Global Startup Script Added	GLOBAL_STARTUP_SCRIPT_ADDED	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when a global startup script is added to a project.
Defense Evasion: Organization-Level Service Account Token Creator Role Added	ORG_LEVEL_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN_CREATOR_ROLE_ADDED	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when the Service Account Token Creator IAM role is granted at the organization level.
Defense Evasion: Project-Level Service Account Token Creator Role Added	PROJECT_LEVEL_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN_CREATOR_ROLE_ADDED	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when the Service Account Token Creator IAM role is granted at the project level.
Lateral Movement: OS Patch Execution From Service Account	OS_PATCH_EXECUTION_FROM_SERVICE_ACCOUNT	Cloud Audit Logs. IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when a service account uses the Compute Engine Patch feature to update the operating system of any currently running Compute Engine instance.
Lateral Movement: Modified Boot Disk Attached to Instance (Preview)	MODIFY_BOOT_DISK_ATTACH_TO_INSTANCE	Cloud Audit Logs: Compute Engine audit logs	Detects when a boot disk is detached from one Compute Engine instance and attached to another, which could indicate a malicious attempt to compromise the system using a modified boot disk.
Credential Access: Secrets Accessed In Kubernetes Namespace	SECRETS_ACCESSED_IN_KUBERNETES_NAMESPACE	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Data Access logs	Detects when secrets or service account tokens are accessed by a service account in the current Kubernetes namespace.
Resource Development: Offensive Security Distro Activity	OFFENSIVE_SECURITY_DISTRO_ACTIVITY	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects successful Google Cloud resource manipulations from known penetration testing or offensive security distros.
Privilege Escalation: New Service Account is Owner or Editor	SERVICE_ACCOUNT_EDITOR_OWNER	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when a new service account is created with Editor or Owner roles for a project.
Discovery: Information Gathering Tool Used	INFORMATION_GATHERING_TOOL_USED	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects the use of ScoutSuite, a cloud security auditing tool that is known to be used by threat actors.
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation	SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_IMPLICIT_DELEGATION	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when the iam.serviceAccounts.implicitDelegation permission is abused to generate access tokens from a more privileged service account.
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation	SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_SIGN_JWT	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when a service account uses the serviceAccounts.signJwt method to generate an access token for another service account.
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation	SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_CROSS_PROJECT_OPENID	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects cross-project use of the iam.serviceAccounts.getOpenIdToken IAM permission. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation	SUSPICIOUS_TOKEN_GENERATION_CROSS_PROJECT_ACCESS_TOKEN	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects cross-project use of the iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken IAM permission. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Cross-Project Permission Use	SUSPICIOUS_CROSS_PROJECT_PERMISSION_DATAFUSION	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects cross-project use of the datafusion.instances.create IAM permission. This finding isn't available for project-level activations.
Command and Control: DNS Tunneling	DNS_TUNNELING_IODINE_HANDSHAKE	Cloud DNS logs	Detects the handshake of the DNS tunneling tool Iodine.
Defense Evasion: VPC Route Masquerade Attempt	VPC_ROUTE_MASQUERADE	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects the manual creation of VPC routes masquerading as Google Cloud default routes, allowing egress traffic to external IP addresses.
Impact: Billing Disabled	BILLING_DISABLED_SINGLE_PROJECT	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when billing has been disabled for a project.
Impact: Billing Disabled	BILLING_DISABLED_MULTIPLE_PROJECTS	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when billing has been disabled for multiple projects in an organization within a short time period.
Impact: VPC Firewall High Priority Block	VPC_FIREWALL_HIGH_PRIORITY_BLOCK	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when a VPC firewall rule that blocks all traffic is added at priority 0.
Impact: VPC Firewall Mass Rule Deletion^Temporarily unavailable	VPC_FIREWALL_MASS_RULE_DELETION	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects the mass deletion of VPC firewall rules by non-service accounts. This rule is temporarily unavailable. To monitor updates to your firewall rules, use the Cloud audit logs.
Impact: Service API Disabled	SERVICE_API_DISABLED	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when a Google Cloud service API is disabled in a production environment.
Impact: Managed Instance Group Autoscaling Set To Maximum	MIG_AUTOSCALING_SET_TO_MAX	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when a managed instance group is configured for maximum autoscaling.
Discovery: Unauthorized Service Account API Call	UNAUTHORIZED_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_API_CALL	Cloud Audit Logs: IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Detects when a service account makes an unauthorized cross-project API call.
Defense Evasion: Anonymous Sessions Granted Cluster Admin Access	ANONYMOUS_SESSIONS_GRANTED_CLUSTER_ADMIN	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Detects the creation of a role-based access control (RBAC) ClusterRoleBinding object adding the root-cluster-admin-binding behavior to anonymous users.
Initial Access: Anonymous GKE Resource Created from the Internet (Preview)	GKE_RESOURCE_CREATED_ANONYMOUSLY_FROM_INTERNET	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Detects resource creation events from effectively anonymous internet users.
Initial Access: GKE Resource Modified Anonymously from the Internet (Preview)	GKE_RESOURCE_MODIFIED_ANONYMOUSLY_FROM_INTERNET	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Detects resource manipulation events from effectively anonymous internet users.
Privilege Escalation: Effectively Anonymous Users Granted GKE Cluster Access (Preview)	GKE_ANONYMOUS_USERS_GRANTED_ACCESS	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone created an RBAC binding that references one of the following users or groups: system:anonymous system:unauthenticated system:authenticated These users and groups are effectively anonymous and should be avoided when creating role bindings or cluster role bindings to any RBAC roles. Review the binding to ensure that it is necessary. If the binding isn't necessary, remove it.
Execution: Suspicious Exec or Attach to a System Pod (Preview)	GKE_SUSPICIOUS_EXEC_ATTACH	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone used the exec or attach commands to get a shell or execute a command on a container running in the kube-system namespace. These methods are sometimes used for legitimate debugging purposes. However, the kube-system namespace is intended for system objects created by Kubernetes, and unexpected command execution or shell creation should be reviewed.
Privilege Escalation: Workload Created with a Sensitive Host Path Mount (Preview)	GKE_SENSITIVE_HOSTPATH	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone created a workload that contains a hostPath volume mount to a sensitive path on the host node's file system. Access to these paths on the host filesystem can be used to access privileged or sensitive information on the node and for container escapes. If possible, don't allow any hostPath volumes in your cluster.
Privilege Escalation: Workload with shareProcessNamespace enabled (Preview)	GKE_SHAREPROCESSNAMESPACE_POD	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone deployed a workload with the shareProcessNamespace option set to true, allowing all containers to share the same Linux process namespace. This could allow an untrusted or compromised container to escalate privileges by accessing and controlling environment variables, memory, and other sensitive data from processes running in other containers.
Privilege Escalation: ClusterRole with Privileged Verbs (Preview)	GKE_CLUSTERROLE_PRIVILEGED_VERBS	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone created an RBAC ClusterRole that contains the bind, escalate, or impersonate verbs. A subject that's bound to a role with these verbs can impersonate other users with higher privileges, bind to additional Roles or ClusterRoles that contain additional permissions, or modify their own ClusterRole permissions. This might lead to those subjects gaining cluster-admin privileges.
Privilege Escalation: ClusterRoleBinding to Privileged Role (Preview)	GKE_CRB_CLUSTERROLE_AGGREGATION_CONTROLLER	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone created an RBAC ClusterRoleBinding that references the default system:controller:clusterrole-aggregation-controller ClusterRole. This default ClusterRole has the escalate verb, which allows subjects to modify the privileges of their own roles, allowing for privilege escalation.
Defense Evasion: Manually Deleted Certificate Signing Request (CSR) (Preview)	GKE_MANUALLY_DELETED_CSR	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone manually deleted a certificate signing request (CSR). CSRs are automatically removed by a garbage collection controller, but malicious actors might manually delete them to evade detection. If the deleted CSR was for an approved and issued certificate, the potentially malicious actor now has an additional authentication method to access the cluster. The permissions associated with the certificate vary depending on which subject they included, but can be highly privileged. Kubernetes does not support certificate revocation.
Credential Access: Failed Attempt to Approve Kubernetes Certificate Signing Request (CSR) (Preview)	GKE_APPROVE_CSR_FORBIDDEN	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone attempted to manually approve a certificate signing request (CSR) but the action failed. Creating a certificate for cluster authentication is a common method for attackers to create persistent access to a compromised cluster. The permissions associated with the certificate vary depending on which subject they included, but can be highly privileged.
Credential Access: Manually Approved Kubernetes Certificate Signing Request (CSR) (Preview)	GKE_CSR_APPROVED	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone manually approved a certificate signing request (CSR). Creating a certificate for cluster authentication is a common method for attackers to create persistent access to a compromised cluster. The permissions associated with the certificate vary depending on which subject they included, but can be highly privileged.
Execution: Kubernetes Pod Created with Potential Reverse Shell Arguments (Preview)	GKE_REVERSE_SHELL_POD	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone created a Pod that contains commands or arguments commonly associated with a reverse shell. Attackers use reverse shells to expand or maintain their initial access to a cluster and to execute arbitrary commands.
Defense Evasion: Potential Kubernetes Pod Masquerading (Preview)	GKE_POD_MASQUERADING	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone deployed a Pod with a naming convention similar to the default workloads that GKE creates for regular cluster operation. This technique is called masquerading.
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Kubernetes Container Names - Exploitation and Escape (Preview)	GKE_SUSPICIOUS_EXPLOIT_POD	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone deployed a Pod with a naming convention similar to common tools used for container escapes or to execute other attacks on the cluster.
Impact: Suspicious Kubernetes Container Names - Coin Mining (Preview)	GKE_SUSPICIOUS_CRYPTOMINING_POD	Cloud Audit Logs: GKE Admin Activity logs	Someone deployed a Pod with a naming convention similar to common cryptocurrency coin miners. This may be an attempt by an attacker who has achieved initial access to the cluster to use the cluster's resources for cryptocurrency mining.

Custom modules for Event Threat Detection

Preview

This feature is subject to the "Pre-GA Offerings Terms" in the General Service Terms section of the Service Specific Terms. Pre-GA features are available "as is" and might have limited support. For more information, see the launch stage descriptions.

In addition to built-in detection rules, Event Threat Detection provides module templates that you can use to create custom detection rules. For more information, see Overview of custom modules for Event Threat Detection.

To create detection rules for which no custom module templates are available, you can export your log data to BigQuery, and then run unique or recurring SQL queries that capture your threat models.

Unsafe Google Group changes

This section explains how Event Threat Detection uses Google Workspace logs, Cloud Audit Logs, and IAM policies to detect unsafe Google Groups changes. Detecting Google Groups changes is only supported when you activate Security Command Center at the organization level.

Google Cloud customers can use Google Groups to manage roles and permissions for members in their organizations, or apply access policies to collections of users. Instead of granting roles directly to members, administrators can grant roles and permissions to Google Groups, and then add members to specific groups. Group members inherit all of a group's roles and permissions, which lets members access specific resources and services.

While Google Groups are a convenient way to manage access control at scale, they can pose a risk if external users from outside your organization or domain are added to privileged groups—groups that are granted sensitive roles or permissions. Sensitive roles control access to security and network settings, logs, and personally identifiable information (PII), and are not recommended for external group members.

In large organizations, administrators might not be aware when external members are added to privileged groups. Cloud Audit Logs record role grants to groups, but those log events don't contain information on group members, which can obscure the potential impact of some group changes.

If you share your Google Workspace logs with Google Cloud, Event Threat Detection monitors your logging streams for new members added to your organization's Google Groups. Because the logs are at the organization level, Event Threat Detection can scan Google Workspace logs only when you activate Security Command Center at the organization level. Event Threat Detection can't scan these logs when you activate Security Command Center at the project level.

Event Threat Detection identifies external group members and, using Cloud Audit Logs, reviews each affected group's IAM roles to check whether the groups are granted sensitive roles. That information is used to detect the following unsafe changes for privileged Google Groups:

• External group members added to privileged groups
• Sensitive roles or permissions granted to groups with external group members
• Privileged groups that are changed to allow anyone in the general public to join

Event Threat Detection writes findings to Security Command Center. Findings contain the email addresses of newly added external members, internal group members that initiate events, group names, and the sensitive roles associated with groups. You can use the information to remove external members from groups or revoke sensitive roles granted to groups.

For more information on Event Threat Detection findings, see Event Threat Detection rules.

Sensitive IAM roles and permissions

This section explains how Event Threat Detection defines sensitive IAM roles. Detections like IAM Anomalous Grant and Unsafe Google Group changes generate findings only if changes involve high- or medium-sensitivity roles. The sensitivity of roles impacts the severity rating assigned to findings.

• High-sensitivity roles control critical services in organizations, including billing, firewall settings, and logging. Findings that match these roles are classified as High severity.
• Medium-sensitivity roles have editing permissions that let principals make changes to Google Cloud resources; and viewing and executing permissions on data storage services that often hold sensitive data. The severity assigned to findings depends on the resource:
  • If medium-sensitivity roles are granted at the organization level, findings are classified as High severity.
  • If medium-sensitivity roles are granted at lower levels in your resource hierarchy (folders, projects, and buckets, among others), findings are classified as Medium severity.

Granting these sensitive roles is considered dangerous if the grantee is an External Member or an abnormal identity, like a principal that has been inactive for a long time.

Granting sensitive roles to external members creates a potential threat because they can be abused for account compromise and data exfiltration.

Finding categories that use these sensitive roles include:

• Persistence: IAM Anomalous Grant
  • Subrule: external_service_account_added_to_policy
  • Subrule: external_member_added_to_policy
• Credential Access: Sensitive Role Granted To Hybrid Group
• Privilege Escalation: Dormant Service Account Granted Sensitive Role

Finding categories that use a subset of the sensitive roles include:

• Persistence: IAM Anomalous Grant
  • Subrule: service_account_granted_sensitive_role_to_member

The service_account_granted_sensitive_role_to_member subrule targets both external and internal members generally and therefore uses only a subset of sensitive roles, as explained in Event Threat Detection rules.

Category	Role	Description
Basic roles: contain thousands of permissions across all Google Cloud services.	roles/owner	Basic roles
	roles/editor
Security roles: control access to security settings	roles/cloudkms.*	All Cloud Key Management Service roles
	roles/cloudsecurityscanner.*	All Web Security Scanner roles
	roles/dlp.*	All Sensitive Data Protection roles
	roles/iam.*	All IAM roles
	roles/secretmanager.*	All Secret Manager roles
	roles/securitycenter.*	All Security Command Center roles
Logging roles: control access to an organization's logs	roles/errorreporting.*	All Error Reporting roles
	roles/logging.*	All Cloud Logging roles
	roles/stackdriver.*	All Cloud Monitoring roles
Personal information roles: control access to resources that contain personally identifiable information, including banking and contact information	roles/billing.*	All Cloud Billing roles
	roles/healthcare.*	All Cloud Healthcare API roles
	roles/essentialcontacts.*	All Essential Contacts roles
Networking roles: control access to an organization's network settings	roles/dns.*	All Cloud DNS roles
	roles/domains.*	All Cloud Domains roles
	roles/networkconnectivity.*	All Network Connectivity Center roles
	roles/networkmanagement.*	All Network Connectivity Center roles
	roles/privateca.*	All Certificate Authority Service roles
Service roles: control access to service resources in Google Cloud	roles/cloudasset.*	All Cloud Asset Inventory roles
	roles/servicedirectory.*	All Service Directory roles
	roles/servicemanagement.*	All Service Management roles
	roles/servicenetworking.*	All Service Networking roles
	roles/serviceusage.*	All Service Usage roles
Compute Engine roles: control access to Compute Engine virtual machines, which carry long-running jobs and are associated with firewall rules	roles/compute.admin roles/compute.instanceAdmin roles/compute.instanceAdmin.v1 roles/compute.loadBalancerAdmin roles/compute.networkAdmin roles/compute.orgFirewallPolicyAdmin roles/compute.orgFirewallPolicyUser roles/compute.orgSecurityPolicyAdmin roles/compute.orgSecurityPolicyUser roles/compute.orgSecurityResourceAdmin roles/compute.osAdminLogin roles/compute.publicIpAdmin roles/compute.securityAdmin roles/compute.storageAdmin roles/compute.xpnAdmin	All Compute Engine Admin and Editor roles

Category	Role	Description
Editing roles: IAM roles that include permissions to make changes to Google Cloud resources	Examples: roles/storage.objectAdmin roles/file.editor roles/source.writer roles/container.developer	Role names usually end with titles like Admin, Owner, Editor, or Writer. Expand the node in the last row of the table to see All medium-sensitivity roles
Data storage roles: IAM roles that include permissions to view and execute data storage services	Examples: roles/cloudsql.viewer roles/cloudsql.client roles/bigquery.dataViewer roles/bigquery.user roles/spanner.databaseReader roles/spanner.databaseUser	Expand the node in the last row of the table to see All medium-sensitivity roles
All medium-sensitivity roles Access Approval roles/accessapproval.approver roles/accessapproval.configEditor Access Context Manager roles/accesscontextmanager.gcpAccessAdmin roles/accesscontextmanager.policyAdmin roles/accesscontextmanager.policyEditor Actions roles/actions.Admin AI Platform roles/ml.admin roles/ml.developer roles/ml.jobOwner roles/ml.modelOwner roles/ml.modelUser API Gateway roles/apigateway.admin App Engine roles/appengine.appAdmin roles/appengine.appCreator roles/appengine.serviceAdmin AutoML roles/automl.admin roles/automl.editor BigQuery roles/bigquery.admin roles/bigquery.dataEditor roles/bigquery.dataOwner roles/bigquery.dataViewer roles/bigquery.resourceAdmin roles/bigquery.resourceEditor roles/bigquery.resourceViewer roles/bigquery.user Binary Authorization roles/binaryauthorization.attestorsAdmin roles/binaryauthorization.attestorsEditor roles/binaryauthorization.policyAdmin roles/binaryauthorization.policyEditor Bigtable roles/bigtable.admin roles/bigtable.reader roles/bigtable.user Cloud Build roles/cloudbuild.builds.builder roles/cloudbuild.builds.editor Cloud Deployment Manager roles/deploymentmanager.editor roles/deploymentmanager.typeEditor Cloud Endpoints roles/endpoints.portalAdmin^Beta Cloud Run functions roles/cloudfunctions.admin roles/cloudfunctions.developer roles/cloudfunctions.invoker Cloud IoT roles/cloudiot.admin roles/cloudiot.deviceController roles/cloudiot.editor roles/cloudiot.provisioner Cloud Life Sciences roles/genomics.admin roles/genomics.admin roles/lifesciences.admin roles/lifesciences.editor Cloud Monitoring roles/monitoring.admin roles/monitoring.alertPolicyEditor roles/monitoring.dashboardEditor roles/monitoring.editor roles/monitoring.metricWriter roles/monitoring.notificationChannelEditor roles/monitoring.servicesEditor roles/monitoring.uptimeCheckConfigEditor Cloud Run roles/run.admin roles/run.developer Cloud Scheduler roles/cloudscheduler.admin Cloud Source Repositories roles/source.admin roles/source.writer Spanner roles/spanner.admin roles/spanner.backupAdmin roles/spanner.backupWriter roles/spanner.databaseAdmin roles/spanner.restoreAdmin roles/spanner.databaseReader roles/spanner.databaseUser Cloud Storage roles/storage.admin roles/storage.hmacKeyAdmin roles/storage.objectAdmin roles/storage.objectCreator roles/storage.objectViewer roles/storage.legacyBucketOwner roles/storage.legacyBucketWriter roles/storage.legacyBucketReader roles/storage.legacyObjectOwner roles/storage.legacyObjectReader Cloud SQL roles/cloudsql.admin roles/cloudsql.editor roles/cloudsql.client roles/cloudsql.instanceUser roles/cloudsql.viewer Cloud Tasks roles/cloudtasks.admin roles/cloudtasks.enqueuer roles/cloudtasks.queueAdmin roles/cloudtasks.taskDeleter Cloud TPU tpu.admin Cloud Trace roles/cloudtrace.admin roles/cloudtrace.agent Compute Engine roles/compute.imageUser roles/compute.osLoginExternalUser roles/osconfig.guestPolicyAdmin roles/osconfig.guestPolicyEditor roles/osconfig.osPolicyAssignmentAdmin roles/osconfig.osPolicyAssignmentEditor roles/osconfig.patchDeploymentAdmin Artifact Analysis roles/containeranalysis.admin roles/containeranalysis.notes.attacher roles/containeranalysis.notes.editor roles/containeranalysis.occurrences.editor Data Catalog roles/datacatalog.admin roles/datacatalog.categoryAdmin roles/datacatalog.entryGroupCreator roles/datacatalog.entryGroupOwner roles/datacatalog.entryOwner Dataflow roles/dataflow.admin roles/dataflow.developer Dataproc roles/dataproc.admin roles/dataproc.editor Dataproc Metastore roles/metastore.admin roles/metastore.editor Datastore roles/datastore.importExportAdmin roles/datastore.indexAdmin roles/datastore.owner roles/datastore.user Eventarc roles/eventarc.admin roles/eventarc.developer roles/eventarc.eventReceiver Filestore roles/file.editor Firebase roles/firebase.admin roles/firebase.analyticsAdmin roles/firebase.developAdmin roles/firebase.growthAdmin roles/firebase.qualityAdmin roles/firebaseabt.admin roles/firebaseappcheck.admin roles/firebaseappdistro.admin roles/firebaseauth.admin roles/firebasecrashlytics.admin roles/firebasedatabase.admin roles/firebasedynamiclinks.admin roles/firebasehosting.admin roles/firebaseinappmessaging.admin roles/firebaseml.admin roles/firebasenotifications.admin roles/firebaseperformance.admin roles/firebasepredictions.admin roles/firebaserules.admin roles/firebasestorage.admin roles/cloudconfig.admin roles/cloudtestservice.testAdmin Game Servers roles/gameservices.admin Google Cloud VMware Engine vmwareengine.vmwareengineAdmin Google Kubernetes Engine roles/container.admin roles/container.clusterAdmin roles/container.developer Google Kubernetes Engine Hub roles/gkehub.admin roles/gkehub.gatewayAdmin roles/gkehub.connect Google Workspace roles/gsuiteaddons.developer Identity-Aware Proxy roles/iap.admin roles/iap.settingsAdmin Managed Service for Microsoft Active Directory roles/managedidentities.admin roles/managedidentities.domainAdmin roles/managedidentities.viewer Memorystore for Redis roles/redis.admin roles/redis.editor On-Demand Scanning API roles/ondemandscanning.admin Ops Config Monitoring roles/opsconfigmonitoring.resourceMetadata.writer Organization Policy Service roles/axt.admin roles/orgpolicy.policyAdmin Other roles roles/autoscaling.metricsWriter roles/autoscaling.sitesAdmin roles/autoscaling.stateWriter roles/chroniclesm.admin roles/dataprocessing.admin roles/earlyaccesscenter.admin roles/firebasecrash.symbolMappingsAdmin roles/identityplatform.admin roles/identitytoolkit.admin roles/oauthconfig.editor roles/retail.admin roles/retail.editor roles/runtimeconfig.admin Proximity Beacon roles/proximitybeacon.attachmentEditor roles/proximitybeacon.beaconEditor Pub/Sub roles/pubsub.admin roles/pubsub.editor Pub/Sub Lite roles/pubsublite.admin roles/pubsublite.editor roles/pubsublite.publisher reCAPTCHA roles/recaptchaenterprise.admin roles/recaptchaenterprise.agent Recommendations roles/automlrecommendations.admin roles/automlrecommendations.editor Recommender roles/recommender.billingAccountCudAdmin roles/recommender.cloudAssetInsightsAdmin roles/recommender.cloudsqlAdmin roles/recommender.computeAdmin roles/recommender.firewallAdmin roles/recommender.iamAdmin roles/recommender.productSuggestionAdmin roles/recommender.projectCudAdmin Resource Manager roles/resourcemanager.folderAdmin roles/resourcemanager.folderCreator roles/resourcemanager.folderEditor roles/resourcemanager.folderIamAdmin roles/resourcemanager.folderMover roles/resourcemanager.lienModifier roles/resourcemanager.organizationAdmin roles/resourcemanager.projectCreator roles/resourcemanager.projectDeleter roles/resourcemanager.projectIamAdmin roles/resourcemanager.projectMover roles/resourcemanager.tagAdmin Resource Settings roles/resourcesettings.admin Serverless VPC Access roles/vpcaccess.admin Service Consumer Management roles/serviceconsumermanagement.tenancyUnitsAdmin Storage Transfer Service roles/storagetransfer.admin roles/storagetransfer.user Vertex AI roles/aiplatform.admin roles/aiplatform.featurestoreAdmin roles/aiplatform.migrator roles/aiplatform.user Vertex AI Workbench user-managed notebooks roles/notebooks.admin roles/notebooks.legacyAdmin Workflows roles/workflows.admin roles/workflows.editor

Log types and activation requirements

This section lists the logs that Event Threat Detection uses, along with the threats that Event Threat Detection looks for in each log, and what, if anything, you need to do to turn on each log.

You need to turn a log on for Event Threat Detection only if all of the following are true:

• You are using the product or service that writes to the log.
• You need to protect the product or service against the threats that Event Threat Detection detects in the log.
• The log is a data access audit log or other log that is off by default.

Certain threats can be detected in multiple logs. If Event Threat Detection can detect a threat in a log that is already turned on, you don't need to turn on another log to detect that same threat.

If a log isn't listed in this section, Event Threat Detection does not scan it, even if it is turned on. For more information, see Potentially redundant log scans.

As described in the following table, some log types are only available at the organization level. If you activate Security Command Center at the project level, Event Threat Detection doesn't scan these logs and doesn't produce any findings.

Tip: To help you evaluate which logs to export and analyze to meet your security and compliance needs, use Google Cloud's Log Scoping Tool.

Foundational log sources

Preview

This feature is subject to the "Pre-GA Offerings Terms" in the General Service Terms section of the Service Specific Terms. Pre-GA features are available "as is" and might have limited support. For more information, see the launch stage descriptions.

Event Threat Detection uses foundational data sources to detect potentially malicious activities in your network.

• If you enable Event Threat Detection without VPC Flow Logs, Event Threat Detection immediately starts analyzing an independent, duplicate, and internal stream of VPC Flow Logs. To further investigate an existing Event Threat Detection finding, you need to enable VPC Flow Logs and manually navigate to Logs Explorer and Flow Analyzer. If you enable VPC Flow Logs at a later date, only future findings will contain the relevant links for further investigation.

• If you enable Event Threat Detection with VPC Flow Logs, Event Threat Detection immediately starts analyzing the VPC Flow Logs in your deployment and provides links to Logs Explorer and Flow Analyzer to help you investigate further.

Potentially redundant log scans

Event Threat Detection can provide network detection of malware by scanning any one of the following logs:

• Cloud DNS logging
• Cloud NAT logging
• Firewall Rules Logging
• VPC Flow Logs

If you are already using Cloud DNS logging, Event Threat Detection can detect malware using domain resolution. For most users, the Cloud DNS logs are sufficient for the network detection of malware.

If you need another level of visibility beyond domain resolution, you can turn on VPC Flow Logs, but VPC Flow Logs can incur costs. To manage these costs, we recommend increasing the aggregation interval to 15 minutes and reducing the sample rate to between 5% and 10%, but there is a tradeoff between recall (higher sample) and cost management (lower sample rate). For more information, see Log sampling and processing.

If you are already using Firewall Rules Logging or Cloud NAT logging, these logs are useful in place of VPC Flow Logs.

You don't need to enable more than one of Cloud NAT logging, Firewall Rules Logging, or VPC Flow Logs.

Logs that you need to turn on

This section lists the Cloud Logging and Google Workspace logs that you can turn on or otherwise configure to increase the number of threats that Event Threat Detection can detect.

Certain threats, such as threats posed by the anomalous impersonation or delegation of a service account, can be found in most audit logs. For these types of threats, you determine which logs you need to turn on based on the products and services you are using.

Logging costs: Before you turn on a log for Event Threat Detection to scan, make sure you understand how Cloud Logging charges for the log data. After turning on a log, monitor the log for a couple of days to ensure that the log doesn't incur any unexpected Logging costs.

Although the scanning of logs by Event Threat Detection does not incur any additional costs, depending on the volume of log data that your organizations and projects produce, Cloud Logging may charge you for the ingestion and storage of the log data.

For information about how Logging charges for logging, see Cloud Logging pricing.

The following table shows specific logs you need to turn on for threats that can be detected in only certain specific log types.

Log type	Threats detected	Configuration required
Cloud DNS logging	Log4j Malware: Bad Domain Malware: bad domain Malware: Cryptomining Bad Domain	Turn on Cloud DNS logging
Cloud NAT logging	Log4j Malware: Bad IP Malware: bad IP Malware: Cryptomining Bad IP	Turn on Cloud NAT logging
Firewall Rules Logging	Log4j Malware: Bad IP Malware: bad IP Malware: Cryptomining Bad IP	Turn on Firewall Rules Logging.
Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) Data Access audit logs	Discovery: Can get sensitive Kubernetes object check Privilege Escalation: Get Kubernetes CSR with compromised bootstrap credentials	Activate Logging Data Access audit logs for GKE
Google Workspace Admin Audit logs	Credential Access: Privileged Group Opened To Public Impair Defenses: Strong Authentication Disabled Impair Defenses: Two Step Verification Disabled Persistence: SSO Enablement Toggle Persistence: SSO Settings Changed	Share Google Workspace Admin Audit logs with Cloud Logging This log type can't be scanned in project-level activations.
Google Workspace Login Audit logs	Credential Access: External Member Added To Privileged Group Impair Defenses: Two Step Verification Disabled Initial Access: Account Disabled Hijacked Initial Access: Disabled Password Leak Initial Access: Government Based Attack Initial Access: Suspicious Login Blocked	Share Google Workspace Login Audit logs with Cloud Logging This log type can't be scanned in project-level activations.
External Application Load Balancer backend service logs	Initial Access: Log4j Compromise Attempt	Turn on external Application Load Balancer logging
Cloud SQL MySQL Data Access audit logs	Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Data Exfiltration	Activate Logging Data Access audit logs for Cloud SQL for MySQL
Cloud SQL PostgreSQL Data Access audit logs	Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Data Exfiltration Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Over-Privileged Grant	Activate Logging Data Access audit logs for Cloud SQL for PostgreSQL. To detect the Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Over-Privileged Grant threat, you must also enable the pgAudit extension
AlloyDB for PostgreSQL Data Access audit logs	Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Database Superuser Writes to User Tables Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Over-Privileged Grant	Activate Logging Data Access audit logs for AlloyDB for PostgreSQL To detect the Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Database Superuser Writes to User Tables and Privilege Escalation: AlloyDB Over-Privileged Grant threats, you must also enable the pgAudit extension
IAM Data Access audit logs	Discovery: Service Account Self-Investigation	Activate Logging Data Access audit logs for Resource Manager
SQL Server Data Access audit logs	Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Data Exfiltration	Activate Logging Data Access audit logs for Cloud SQL for SQL Server
Generic Data Access audit logs	Initial Access: Leaked Service Account Key Used Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Data Access Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for Data Access	Activate Logging Data Access audit logs.
authlogs/authlog on virtual machines	Brute force SSH	Install the Ops Agent or the legacy Logging agent on your VM hosts
VPC Flow Logs	Log4j Malware: Bad IP Malware: bad IP Malware: Cryptomining Bad IP	Turn on VPC Flow Logs

Logs that are always on

The following table lists the Cloud Logging logs that you don't need to turn on or configure. These logs are always on and Event Threat Detection scans them automatically.

Log type	Threats detected	Configuration required
BigQueryAuditMetadata Data Access logs	Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Exfiltration Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Extraction Exfiltration: BigQuery Data to Google Drive Exfiltration: Move to Public BigQuery resource (Preview)	None
Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) Admin Activity audit logs	Privilege Escalation: Changes to sensitive Kubernetes RBAC objects Privilege Escalation: Creation of sensitive Kubernetes bindings Privilege Escalation: Launch of privileged Kubernetes container Privilege Escalation: Create Kubernetes CSR for master cert Defense Evasion: Anonymous Sessions Granted Cluster Admin Access Initial Access: Anonymous GKE Resource Created from the Internet (Preview) Initial Access: GKE Resource Modified Anonymously from the Internet (Preview) Privilege Escalation: Effectively Anonymous Users Granted GKE Cluster Access (Preview) Execution: Suspicious Exec or Attach to a System Pod (Preview) Privilege Escalation: Workload Created with a Sensitive Host Path Mount (Preview) Privilege Escalation: Workload with shareProcessNamespace enabled (Preview) Privilege Escalation: ClusterRole with Privileged Verbs (Preview) Privilege Escalation: ClusterRoleBinding to Privileged Role (Preview) Defense Evasion: Manually Deleted Certificate Signing Request (CSR) (Preview) Credential Access: Failed Attempt to Approve Kubernetes Certificate Signing Request (CSR) (Preview) Credential Access: Manually Approved Kubernetes Certificate Signing Request (CSR) (Preview) Execution: Kubernetes Pod Created with Potential Reverse Shell Arguments (Preview) Defense Evasion: Potential Kubernetes Pod Masquerading (Preview) Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Kubernetes Container Names - Exploitation and Escape (Preview) Impact: Suspicious Kubernetes Container Names - Coin Mining (Preview)	None
IAM Admin Activity audit logs	Credential Access: Sensitive Role Granted To Hybrid Group Privilege Escalation: Dormant Service Account Granted Sensitive Role Persistence: Impersonation Role Granted For Dormant Service Account Persistence: IAM Anomalous Grant (Preview) Persistence: Unmanaged Account Granted Sensitive Role	None
MySQL Admin Activity logs	Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External Organization	None
PostgreSQL Admin Activity logs	Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External Organization	None
SQL Server Admin Activity logs	Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External Organization	None
Generic Admin Activity audit logs	Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Action> Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Key Created Initial Access: Excessive Permission Denied Actions Initial Access: Leaked Service Account Key Used Persistence: GCE Admin Added SSH Key Persistence: GCE Admin Added Startup Script Persistence: New API Method Persistence: New Geography Persistence: New User Agent Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Impersonation of Service Account for Admin Activity Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Multistep Service Account Delegation for Admin Activity Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Service Account Impersonator for Admin Activity Lateral Movement: Modified Boot Disk Attached to Instance (Preview)	None
VPC Service Controls Audit logs	Defense Evasion: Modify VPC Service Control (Preview)	None
Backup and DR Admin Activity audit logs	Data destruction: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire all images Inhibit system recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete policy Inhibit system recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete template Inhibit system recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete profile Inhibit system recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR delete storage pool Inhibit system recovery: deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR host Data destruction: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire image Data destruction: Google Cloud Backup and DR remove appliance Inhibit system recovery: Google Cloud Backup and DR remove plan Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduce backup expiration Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduce backup frequency	None

What's next

• Learn about using Event Threat Detection.
• Learn how to investigate and develop response plans for threats.