Google Cloud Attestation
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認證程序可建立對機密運算的信任感。認證機制可做為數位驗證機制，確保機密資料只會在經過嚴格審查的硬體式受信任執行環境 (TEE) 中處理。
Google Cloud 驗證提供統一的解決方案，可遠端驗證所有 Google 機密環境的可靠性。這項服務支援機密環境的認證，並以 SEV 的虛擬信任平台模組 (vTPM) 和 Intel TDX 的 TDX 模組為後盾。
Google Cloud 認證可套用至下列 Google Cloud服務：
雖然 Google Cloud 驗證很方便，但開放原始碼工具也可以直接為機密 VM 執行個體取得驗證報告。詳情請參閱「要求認證報告」。
Google Cloud 驗證的運作方式
Google Cloud 認證會直接向硬體供應商收集認可，並維護專為各機密環境量身打造的一組參考值和評估政策。這項服務提供 API，供 Google Cloud 使用者擷取認證結果聲明權杖。
Google Cloud 驗證會從機密環境收集資訊，並根據核准的值和 Google 維護的政策進行檢查。這些檢查會轉換為可驗證的聲明，並遵守 IETF 遠端認證程序 (RATS) 實體認證權杖 (EAT) 標準。接著，Google Cloud 驗證會提供這些聲明的加密證明，供依據這類聲明的服務使用，例如 Secret Manager 和 Google Identity and Access Management (IAM)。
您可以透過下列方式驗證加密證明：
使用公開金鑰。詳情請參閱「OIDC 權杖」。這個選項較為簡單，可與 OIDC 相容應用程式原生搭配使用。
使用根憑證。詳情請參閱「PKI 權杖」。這個選項可離線驗證，不需要每個信賴方探索驗證金鑰。如需離線驗證的端對端範例，請參閱「Use Confidential Space with protected resources that aren't stored with a cloud provider」程式碼研究室。
RATS 架構總覽
遠端認證程序 (RATS) 架構包含下列主要實體：
認證者：提供可信度證據的實體。Google Cloud，這是機密環境 (例如機密 VM、機密 GKE 節點或 Confidential Space)。
驗證者：負責評估證據並生成認證結果的實體。這就是 Google Cloud Attestation。
憑證核發機構：依據認證結果做出決策的實體 (例如行動應用程式、儲存空間值區或金鑰管理系統)。
RATS 架構包含下列主要角色：
信賴方擁有者：為信賴方設定評估政策的實體。
驗證者擁有者：為驗證者設定評估政策的實體 (例如 Google)。
背書者：提供背書的實體，用來驗證認證者的功能 (例如 AMD、Intel 或 Nvidia 等硬體 OEM)。
參考值提供者：提供參考值的實體，供驗證者驗證認證者的聲明。
護照模型認證工作流程
Google Cloud Attestation 使用護照模型。護照模型的高階工作流程包含下列步驟：
認證者 (機密環境) 會提供證據，向驗證者 (Google Cloud Attestation) 要求認證結果。
驗證者會評估證據並核發認證結果。
認證者會將這項結果提供給信任方。
在這個工作流程中，Google Cloud Attestation 會做為驗證者。機密環境 (例如機密 VM、機密 GKE 節點或 Confidential Space) 會做為驗證者。信賴方包括 Thales EKM、Google IAM 和其他權杖中介服務。
為確保認證結果的即時性，Google Cloud Attestation 會使用無法重複使用的加密編號。認證者可以向驗證者提供與信賴方同意的隨機號碼。然後，信賴方可以驗證這個號碼，確保號碼有效且正確。
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上次更新時間：2025-09-04 (世界標準時間)。
[[["容易理解","easyToUnderstand","thumb-up"],["確實解決了我的問題","solvedMyProblem","thumb-up"],["其他","otherUp","thumb-up"]],[["難以理解","hardToUnderstand","thumb-down"],["資訊或程式碼範例有誤","incorrectInformationOrSampleCode","thumb-down"],["缺少我需要的資訊/範例","missingTheInformationSamplesINeed","thumb-down"],["翻譯問題","translationIssue","thumb-down"],["其他","otherDown","thumb-down"]],["上次更新時間：2025-09-04 (世界標準時間)。"],[[["\u003cp\u003eAttestation is a digital verification process that establishes trust by ensuring confidential data is processed only within vetted, hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs).\u003c/p\u003e\n"],["\u003cp\u003eGoogle Cloud Attestation provides a unified solution for remotely verifying the trustworthiness of Google confidential environments, supporting technologies like AMD SEV, SEV-SNP, and Intel TDX across services such as Confidential VM, Confidential Space, and Confidential GKE Nodes.\u003c/p\u003e\n"],["\u003cp\u003eGoogle Cloud Attestation collects data from confidential environments, compares it against approved values and policies, and generates verifiable claims that conform to the IETF RATS EAT standard.\u003c/p\u003e\n"],["\u003cp\u003eThe Remote ATtestation ProcedureS (RATS) architecture involves an Attester (confidential environment), a Verifier (Google Cloud Attestation), and a Relying Party (e.g., mobile app, key management system).\u003c/p\u003e\n"],["\u003cp\u003eGoogle Cloud Attestation follows a passport model, where the attester requests an attestation result from the verifier, which is then presented to the relying party, ensuring data security and trust.\u003c/p\u003e\n"]]],[],null,["# Google Cloud Attestation\n\nAttestation is the process that establishes trust in\n[Confidential Computing](/confidential-computing/docs/confidential-computing-overview).\nAttestation acts as a digital verification mechanism, ensuring that confidential\ndata is only processed within hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments\n(TEEs) that have been rigorously vetted.\n\nGoogle Cloud Attestation provides a unified solution for remotely verifying the\ntrustworthiness of all Google confidential environments. The service supports\nattestation of confidential environments backed by a Virtual Trusted Platform\nModule (vTPM) for SEV and the TDX Module for Intel TDX.\n\nGoogle Cloud Attestation can be applied across the following Google Cloud\nservices:\n\nWhile Google Cloud Attestation is convenient, open-source tools can also\nobtain attestation reports directly for Confidential VM instances.\nFor more details, see [Request an attestation report](/confidential-computing/confidential-vm/docs/attestation#request_an_attestation_report).\n\nHow Google Cloud Attestation works\n----------------------------------\n\nGoogle Cloud Attestation internally gathers endorsements directly from\nhardware vendors and upholds its own set of reference values and appraisal\npolicies specifically tailored for each confidential environment. It provides\nAPIs for Google Cloud users to fetch attestation result claims tokens.\n\nGoogle Cloud Attestation collects information from your confidential\nenvironment and checks it against approved values and Google-maintained\npolicies. These checks are converted into verifiable claims that adhere to the\n[IETF Remote ATtestation ProcedureS (RATS) Entity Attestation Token (EAT)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-eat/)\nstandard. Then, Google Cloud Attestation provides cryptographic proofs of\nthese claims that can be used by services relying on such claims, such as\nSecret Manager and Google\n[Identity and Access Management (IAM)](/security/products/iam).\n\nThe cryptographic proofs can be validated in the following ways:\n\n1. Using a public key. For more information, see\n [OIDC tokens](/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-validation-endpoint-fields#oidc).\n This is the simpler option and works natively with OIDC compatible applications.\n\n2. Using a root certificate. For more information, see\n [PKI tokens](/confidential-computing/confidential-space/docs/reference/token-validation-endpoint-fields#pki).\n This option allows offline verification, without the need for each relying\n party to discover the verification key. For an end-to-end example of offline\n validation, see the\n [Use Confidential Space with protected resources that aren't stored with a cloud provider](https://codelabs.developers.google.com/confidential-space-pki#0) codelab.\n\nRATS architecture overview\n--------------------------\n\nThe Remote ATtestation ProcedureS (RATS) architecture involves the following\nprimary entities:\n\n- Attester: An entity providing evidence of its trustworthiness. In\n Google Cloud, this is a confidential environment (for example, Confidential VM,\n Confidential GKE Nodes, or Confidential Space).\n\n- Verifier: An entity evaluating the evidence and generating attestation\n results. This is Google Cloud Attestation.\n\n- Relying party: An entity relying on the attestation results to make decisions\n (for example, a mobile app, storage bucket, or key management system).\n\nThe RATS architecture encompasses the following key roles:\n\n- Relying party owner: An entity configuring the appraisal policy for the\n relying party.\n\n- Verifier owner: An entity configuring the appraisal policy for the verifier\n (for example, Google).\n\n- Endorser: An entity providing endorsements validating the attester's\n capabilities (for example, hardware OEMs like AMD, Intel, or Nvidia).\n\n- Reference value provider: An entity providing reference values for the\n verifier to validate the attester's claims.\n\nPassport model attestation workflow\n-----------------------------------\n\nGoogle Cloud Attestation uses the *passport model*. The high-level workflow of\nthe passport model involves the following steps:\n\n1. The attester (confidential environment) requests an attestation result\n from the verifier (Google Cloud Attestation) by providing evidence.\n\n2. The verifier evaluates the evidence and issues an attestation result.\n\n3. The attester presents this result to the relying party.\n\nIn this workflow, Google Cloud Attestation acts as the verifier. Confidential\nenvironments such as (Confidential VM, Confidential GKE Nodes, or\nConfidential Space) act as the attester. Relying parties include Thales EKM, Google\nIAM, and other token brokers.\n\nTo ensure the freshness of attestation results, Google Cloud Attestation\nuses a cryptographic number that can't be reused. The attester can provide a\nrandom number, which is agreed upon with the relying party, to the verifier.\nThe relying party can then validate this number to ensure freshness and\ncorrectness."]]
